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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
82 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
82 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference: Service Account Abuse Detection
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## Active Directory PowerShell Module
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### Get Service Accounts (SPN-based)
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```powershell
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Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties `
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ServicePrincipalName, LastLogonDate, Enabled, PasswordLastSet, `
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PasswordNeverExpires, AdminCount, MemberOf
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```
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### Get Managed Service Accounts
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```powershell
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Get-ADServiceAccount -Filter * -Properties `
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PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword, LastLogonDate
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```
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### Check Kerberos Delegation
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```powershell
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Get-ADUser -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $true} -Properties `
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TrustedForDelegation, TrustedToAuthForDelegation, `
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msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo
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```
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## Windows Event Log Queries
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### Logon Type Values
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| Type | Description | Concern for Service Accounts |
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|------|-------------|------------------------------|
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| 2 | Interactive | HIGH — should not happen |
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| 3 | Network | Normal for services |
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| 5 | Service | Normal |
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| 10 | RemoteInteractive (RDP) | HIGH — should not happen |
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### Event IDs
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| ID | Log | Description |
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|----|-----|-------------|
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| 4624 | Security | Successful logon |
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| 4625 | Security | Failed logon |
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| 4648 | Security | Explicit credential use |
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| 4672 | Security | Special privilege logon |
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| 4720 | Security | Account created |
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| 4738 | Security | Account modified |
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## Microsoft Graph API — Service Principal Audit
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### List Service Principals
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```http
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GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals
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Authorization: Bearer {token}
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```
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### List App Role Assignments
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```http
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GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals/{id}/appRoleAssignments
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```
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### Audit Sign-In Logs
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```http
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GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns
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?$filter=appId eq '{service-principal-app-id}'
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```
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## AWS IAM — Service Role Audit
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### List service-linked roles
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```bash
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aws iam list-roles --query "Roles[?starts_with(Path, '/aws-service-role/')]"
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```
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### Get role last used
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```bash
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aws iam get-role --role-name MyServiceRole \
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--query "Role.RoleLastUsed"
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```
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### Access Analyzer findings
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```bash
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aws accessanalyzer list-findings --analyzer-arn {arn} \
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--filter '{"resourceType":{"eq":["AWS::IAM::Role"]}}'
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```
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