mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
122 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
122 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# Detailed Hunting Workflow - Process Hollowing Detection
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## Phase 1: Sysmon-Based Detection
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### Step 1.1 - Process Tampering Events (Sysmon v13+)
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=25
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| table _time Computer User Image Type
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| sort -_time
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```
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### Step 1.2 - Suspicious Process Creation Patterns
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=1
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| where match(Image, "(?i)(svchost|explorer|rundll32|dllhost|conhost|taskhost)\.exe$")
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| where NOT match(ParentImage, "(?i)(services\.exe|explorer\.exe|svchost\.exe|userinit\.exe|winlogon\.exe)")
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| table _time Computer User Image ParentImage CommandLine
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```
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### Step 1.3 - KQL for MDE ProcessTampering
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```kql
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DeviceEvents
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| where ActionType == "ProcessTampering"
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| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
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InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AdditionalFields
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| order by Timestamp desc
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```
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## Phase 2: Parent-Child Process Validation
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### Step 2.1 - Invalid Parent-Child Relationships
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Known legitimate parent-child pairs:
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- services.exe -> svchost.exe
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- explorer.exe -> user applications
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- winlogon.exe -> userinit.exe
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- svchost.exe -> specific service children
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=1
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| eval expected_parent=case(
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match(Image,"(?i)svchost\.exe$"), "services.exe",
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match(Image,"(?i)taskhost\.exe$"), "svchost.exe",
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match(Image,"(?i)userinit\.exe$"), "winlogon.exe",
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match(Image,"(?i)smss\.exe$"), "System",
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1=1, "any"
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)
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| eval parent_name=mvindex(split(ParentImage,"\\"),-1)
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| where expected_parent!="any" AND NOT match(parent_name, expected_parent)
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| table _time Computer Image ParentImage expected_parent parent_name CommandLine
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```
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## Phase 3: Memory Analysis
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### Step 3.1 - pe-sieve Scanning
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```powershell
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# Scan all processes for hollowing
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Get-Process | ForEach-Object {
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$pid = $_.Id
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& pe-sieve64.exe /pid $pid /shellc /dmode 1 /json
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}
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```
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### Step 3.2 - Hollows Hunter Full Scan
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```powershell
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# Run Hollows Hunter for automated detection
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hollows_hunter64.exe /loop /json /dir C:\hunt_output
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```
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### Step 3.3 - Volatility Malfind
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```bash
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# Detect injected/modified process memory
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python vol.py -f memory.raw windows.malfind
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# Dump suspicious processes
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python vol.py -f memory.raw windows.pslist --dump
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```
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## Phase 4: Behavioral Analysis
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### Step 4.1 - Process Behavior Mismatches
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Look for processes whose network/file behavior contradicts their identity:
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=3
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| where match(Image, "(?i)(svchost|dllhost|taskhost|conhost)\.exe$")
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| where NOT match(DestinationIp, "^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.)")
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| where DestinationPort NOT IN (53, 80, 443, 123)
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| stats count by Image DestinationIp DestinationPort Computer
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```
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### Step 4.2 - Hollowed Process C2 Indicators
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=3
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| where match(Image, "(?i)(svchost|explorer|rundll32)\.exe$")
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| bin _time span=1s
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| streamstats current=f last(_time) as prev by Image Computer DestinationIp
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| eval interval=_time-prev
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| stats count avg(interval) as avg_interval stdev(interval) as sd by Image Computer DestinationIp
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| eval cv=sd/avg_interval
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| where cv < 0.3 AND count > 20
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```
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## Phase 5: API Call Monitoring
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### Step 5.1 - Critical API Sequences
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Monitor for this specific API call chain:
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1. `CreateProcessW` / `CreateProcessA` with `CREATE_SUSPENDED` (0x00000004)
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2. `NtUnmapViewOfSection` / `ZwUnmapViewOfSection`
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3. `VirtualAllocEx` with `PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE`
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4. `WriteProcessMemory`
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5. `SetThreadContext` / `NtSetContextThread`
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6. `ResumeThread` / `NtResumeThread`
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### Step 5.2 - ETW Process Hollowing Detection
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```powershell
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# Monitor for suspicious API patterns via ETW
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# Requires elevated privileges
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$session = New-EtwTraceSession -Name "ProcessHollowHunt"
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Add-EtwTraceProvider -SessionName "ProcessHollowHunt" `
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-Guid "{22FB2CD6-0E7B-422B-A0C7-2FAD1FD0E716}" `
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-Level 5
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```
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