mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
110 lines
4.5 KiB
Markdown
110 lines
4.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: detecting-process-hollowing-technique
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description: Detect process hollowing (T1055.012) by analyzing memory-mapped sections, hollowed process indicators, and parent-child
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process anomalies in EDR telemetry.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- threat-hunting
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- mitre-attack
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- process-hollowing
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- process-injection
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- edr
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- t1055
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- proactive-detection
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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d3fend_techniques:
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- Platform Monitoring
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- Process Code Segment Verification
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- Segment Address Offset Randomization
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- Process Analysis
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- Application Hardening
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Detecting Process Hollowing Technique
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## When to Use
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- When investigating suspected fileless malware or in-memory threats
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- After EDR alerts on process injection or suspicious memory operations
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- When hunting for defense evasion techniques in a compromised environment
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- When threat intel reports indicate process hollowing in active campaigns
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- During purple team exercises validating T1055.012 detection coverage
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## Prerequisites
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- EDR with memory protection monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
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- Sysmon with Event IDs 1 (Process Create), 8 (CreateRemoteThread), 25 (ProcessTampering)
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- Windows ETW providers for process hollowing (Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process)
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- Memory forensics capabilities (Volatility, WinDbg)
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- Process integrity monitoring tools
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## Workflow
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1. **Understand Hollowing Mechanics**: Process hollowing involves creating a legitimate process in suspended state, unmapping its memory, writing malicious code, then resuming execution.
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2. **Monitor Suspended Process Creation**: Hunt for processes created with CREATE_SUSPENDED flag followed by memory writes and thread resumption.
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3. **Detect Memory Section Anomalies**: Identify processes where the in-memory image differs from the on-disk binary (image mismatch).
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4. **Analyze Parent-Child Process Trees**: Flag processes whose behavior does not match their binary name (e.g., svchost.exe making unusual network connections).
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5. **Check Process Integrity**: Compare process memory sections against the legitimate binary on disk.
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6. **Correlate with Network Activity**: Hollowed processes often establish C2 connections - correlate suspicious process behavior with network logs.
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7. **Document and Contain**: Report findings, isolate affected endpoints, and update detection rules.
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## Key Concepts
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| Concept | Description |
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|---------|-------------|
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| T1055.012 | Process Injection: Process Hollowing |
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| T1055 | Process Injection (parent technique) |
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| T1055.001 | DLL Injection |
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| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |
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| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call |
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| CREATE_SUSPENDED | Windows flag to create a process in suspended state |
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| NtUnmapViewOfSection | API to unmap process memory sections |
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| WriteProcessMemory | API to write into another process's memory |
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| ResumeThread | API to resume a suspended thread |
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| Image Mismatch | Process memory content differs from on-disk binary |
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| Process Doppelganging | Related technique using NTFS transactions (T1055.013) |
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## Tools & Systems
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| Tool | Purpose |
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|------|---------|
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| CrowdStrike Falcon | Memory protection and hollowing detection |
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| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | ProcessTampering alerts |
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| Sysmon v13+ | Event ID 25 ProcessTampering detection |
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| Volatility | Memory forensics - malfind plugin |
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| pe-sieve | Process memory scanner for hollowed processes |
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| Hollows Hunter | Automated hollowed process detection |
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| Process Hacker | Live process memory inspection |
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| API Monitor | Monitor NtUnmapViewOfSection calls |
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## Common Scenarios
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1. **Svchost.exe Hollowing**: Malware creates svchost.exe suspended, hollows it, injects backdoor code - process appears legitimate but behaves maliciously.
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2. **Explorer.exe Hollowing**: Attacker hollows explorer.exe to inherit its network permissions and trusted process context.
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3. **Rundll32 Hollowing**: Malicious loader creates rundll32.exe, replaces its memory with implant code for C2 beaconing.
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4. **Multi-Stage Hollowing**: Loader uses process hollowing as first stage, then performs additional injection into services.
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## Output Format
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```
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Hunt ID: TH-HOLLOW-[DATE]-[SEQ]
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Technique: T1055.012
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Hollowed Process: [Process name and PID]
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Original Binary: [Expected on-disk path]
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Parent Process: [Parent name and PID]
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Memory Mismatch: [Yes/No]
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Suspicious APIs: [NtUnmapViewOfSection, WriteProcessMemory, etc.]
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Network Activity: [C2 connections if any]
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Host: [Hostname]
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User: [Account context]
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Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
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```
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