mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
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Standards - Detecting Privilege Escalation in Kubernetes Pods
MITRE ATT&CK for Containers
| Technique | ID | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Escape to Host | T1611 | Container breakout via privilege escalation |
| Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | T1068 | Kernel exploit from container |
| Abuse Elevation Control | T1548 | Setuid/setgid binary exploitation |
| Valid Accounts | T1078 | Service account token theft |
| Create Account | T1136 | Modify /etc/passwd in container |
CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.8
- 5.2.1-5.2.9: Pod Security Standards
- 5.7.3: Apply security context to pods
NIST SP 800-190
- Section 4.3: Container runtime vulnerabilities
- Section 5.4: Runtime monitoring for privilege escalation
Pod Security Standards
| Profile | Level | Key Restrictions |
|---|---|---|
| Privileged | Unrestricted | No restrictions |
| Baseline | Minimally restrictive | No privileged, no hostPID/hostNetwork |
| Restricted | Heavily restricted | Non-root, drop all caps, no privilege escalation |