Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

67 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown

# API Reference: Detecting Network Scanning with IDS Signatures
## Scan Types and Detection
| Scan Type | Method | Detection |
|-----------|--------|-----------|
| SYN Scan | Half-open SYN packets | Many SYN without ACK |
| Connect Scan | Full TCP handshake | Many connections, short duration |
| Host Sweep | Same port, many hosts | Single port, >10 destinations |
| Service Enum | Banner grabbing | Short-lived connections |
## Suricata EVE JSON Format
```json
{
"event_type": "alert",
"src_ip": "10.0.0.5",
"dest_ip": "192.168.1.100",
"alert": {
"signature": "ET SCAN Nmap SYN Scan",
"category": "Attempted Information Leak",
"severity": 2,
"signature_id": 2000001
}
}
```
## Suricata Scan Detection Rules
```
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Port Scan Detected"; \
flags:S; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 25, seconds 60; \
sid:5000001;)
```
## Zeek conn.log Fields
```
#fields ts uid id.orig_h id.orig_p id.resp_h id.resp_p proto service
duration orig_bytes resp_bytes conn_state
```
## Detection Thresholds
| Metric | Threshold | Severity |
|--------|-----------|----------|
| Unique ports per destination | >20 | HIGH |
| Unique ports >100 | >100 | CRITICAL |
| Hosts per single port sweep | >10 | MEDIUM |
| Hosts >50 | >50 | HIGH |
## Splunk SPL Detection
```spl
index=network
| stats dc(dest_port) as unique_ports by src_ip, dest_ip
| where unique_ports > 20
| sort -unique_ports
```
## CLI Usage
```bash
python agent.py --eve-log eve.json
python agent.py --conn-log conn.log --port-threshold 25 --sweep-threshold 15
```