Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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2.4 KiB
Markdown

# API Reference: Detecting Insider Threat with UEBA
## Elasticsearch Aggregation Queries
### Per-User Daily Activity Baseline
```json
{
"aggs": {
"users": {
"terms": {"field": "user.name", "size": 5000},
"aggs": {
"daily_events": {"date_histogram": {"field": "@timestamp", "calendar_interval": "day"}},
"unique_hosts": {"cardinality": {"field": "host.name"}},
"data_volume": {"sum": {"field": "bytes_transferred"}}
}
}
}
}
```
### Anomaly Detection (Z-Score > 3)
```python
from elasticsearch import Elasticsearch
es = Elasticsearch(["https://localhost:9200"], api_key="base64key")
result = es.search(index="logs-*", body=query)
z_score = (current - baseline_avg) / baseline_std
```
## Insider Threat Indicators
| Indicator | Detection Method | Severity |
|-----------|-----------------|----------|
| Activity spike | Z-score > 3 standard deviations | High |
| Data exfiltration | Volume > 5x daily average | Critical |
| New host access | Unique hosts > 2x baseline | High |
| Off-hours activity | Login outside 06:00-22:00 | Medium |
| Peer group outlier | Activity > 3x peer average | Medium |
| Privilege escalation | New admin role assignment | Critical |
| Resignation + download | HR flag + high data volume | Critical |
## Elasticsearch Python Client
```bash
pip install elasticsearch>=8.0
```
| Method | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `es.search(index, body)` | Execute aggregation query |
| `es.indices.get_alias("logs-*")` | List matching indices |
| `es.count(index)` | Get document count |
## Risk Scoring Model
| Score Range | Risk Level | Action |
|-------------|------------|--------|
| 0 - 30 | Low | No action |
| 31 - 60 | Medium | Monitor |
| 61 - 80 | High | SOC investigation |
| 81 - 100 | Critical | Immediate response |
## MITRE ATT&CK Insider Techniques
| Technique | ID | UEBA Detection |
|-----------|----|----------------|
| Data from Local System | T1005 | Volume anomaly on file servers |
| Exfiltration Over Web Service | T1567 | Cloud upload volume spike |
| Account Manipulation | T1098 | Unusual privilege changes |
| Valid Accounts | T1078 | Off-hours or location anomaly |
### References
- Elasticsearch Python Client: https://elasticsearch-py.readthedocs.io/
- MITRE Insider Threat: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
- NIST SP 800-53 AC-2: https://csf.tools/reference/nist-sp-800-53/r5/ac/ac-2/