mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
101 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
101 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs
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description: Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory by analyzing Kerberos TGT anomalies including mismatched encryption
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types, impossible ticket lifetimes, non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures in domain controller event logs.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- threat-hunting
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- golden-ticket
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- kerberos
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- active-directory
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- mitre-t1558-001
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- credential-abuse
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Detecting Golden Ticket Attacks in Kerberos Logs
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## When to Use
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- When KRBTGT account hash may have been compromised via DCSync or NTDS.dit extraction
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- When hunting for forged Kerberos tickets used for persistent domain access
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- After incident response reveals credential theft at the domain level
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- When investigating impossible logon patterns (users logging in from multiple locations simultaneously)
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- During post-breach assessment to determine if Golden Tickets are in use
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## Prerequisites
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- Windows Security Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771 on domain controllers
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- Kerberos policy configuration knowledge (max ticket lifetime, encryption types)
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- Domain controller audit policy enabling Kerberos Service Ticket Operations
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- SIEM with ability to correlate Kerberos events across multiple DCs
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## Workflow
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1. **Monitor TGT Requests (Event 4768)**: Track Kerberos authentication service requests. Golden Tickets bypass the AS-REQ/AS-REP exchange entirely, so the absence of 4768 before 4769 is suspicious.
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2. **Detect Encryption Type Anomalies**: Golden Tickets often use RC4 (0x17) encryption. If your domain enforces AES (0x12), any RC4 TGT is a red flag. Monitor TicketEncryptionType in Event 4769.
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3. **Check Ticket Lifetime Anomalies**: Default Kerberos TGT lifetime is 10 hours with 7-day renewal. Golden Tickets can be forged with 10-year lifetimes. Detect tickets with durations exceeding policy.
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4. **Hunt for Non-Existent SIDs**: Golden Tickets can include arbitrary SIDs (including non-existent accounts or groups). Correlate TGS requests against known AD SID inventory.
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5. **Detect TGS Without Prior TGT**: When a service ticket (4769) appears without a preceding TGT request (4768) from the same IP/account, this may indicate a pre-existing Golden Ticket.
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6. **Monitor KRBTGT Password Age**: Track when KRBTGT was last reset. If KRBTGT hash hasn't changed since a known compromise, Golden Tickets from that period remain valid.
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7. **Validate PAC Signatures**: With KB5008380+ and PAC validation enforcement, domain controllers reject forged PACs. Monitor for Kerberos failures indicating PAC validation errors.
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## Detection Queries
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### Splunk -- RC4 Encryption in Kerberos TGS
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```spl
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index=wineventlog EventCode=4769
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| where TicketEncryptionType="0x17"
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| where ServiceName!="krbtgt"
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| stats count by TargetUserName ServiceName IpAddress TicketEncryptionType Computer
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| where count > 5
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| sort -count
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```
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### Splunk -- TGS Without Prior TGT
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```spl
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index=wineventlog (EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)
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| stats earliest(_time) as first_tgt by TargetUserName IpAddress EventCode
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| eventstats earliest(eval(if(EventCode=4768, first_tgt, null()))) as tgt_time by TargetUserName IpAddress
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| where EventCode=4769 AND (isnull(tgt_time) OR first_tgt < tgt_time)
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| table TargetUserName IpAddress first_tgt tgt_time
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```
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### KQL -- Golden Ticket Indicators
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```kql
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SecurityEvent
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| where EventID == 4769
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| where TicketEncryptionType == "0x17"
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| where ServiceName != "krbtgt"
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| summarize Count=count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, ServiceName
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| where Count > 5
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```
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## Common Scenarios
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1. **Post-DCSync Golden Ticket**: After extracting KRBTGT hash, attacker forges TGT with Domain Admin SID, valid for months until KRBTGT is rotated twice.
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2. **RC4 Downgrade**: Golden Ticket forged with RC4 encryption in an AES-only environment, detectable by encryption type mismatch.
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3. **Cross-Domain Golden Ticket**: Forged inter-realm TGT used to pivot between AD domains/forests.
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4. **Persistence After Remediation**: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).
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## Output Format
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```
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Hunt ID: TH-GOLDEN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
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Suspected Account: [Account using forged ticket]
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Source IP: [Client IP]
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Target Service: [SPN accessed]
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Encryption Type: [RC4/AES128/AES256]
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Anomaly: [No prior TGT/RC4 in AES environment/Extended lifetime]
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KRBTGT Last Reset: [Date]
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Risk Level: [Critical]
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```
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