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https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.2 KiB
2.2 KiB
Workflows - Detecting Evasion Techniques in Endpoint Logs
Workflow 1: Evasion Technique Threat Hunt
[Select evasion technique to hunt]
│
├── T1055 Process Injection
├── T1070 Log Tampering
├── T1036 Masquerading
├── T1562 Security Tool Disabling
│
▼
[Craft detection query (Splunk/KQL/Elastic)]
│
▼
[Execute across 30-90 days of endpoint telemetry]
│
▼
[Triage results]
│
├── Known-good (allowlist) ──► [Add to baseline, refine query]
├── Suspicious ──► [Deep investigation]
│ │
│ ├── Correlate with other telemetry
│ ├── Check process tree
│ ├── Review network connections
│ │
│ ├── True positive ──► [Escalate to IR]
│ └── False positive ──► [Tune detection]
│
└── No results ──► [Validate logging covers technique]
Workflow 2: Detection Rule Deployment
[Create Sigma/SIEM detection rule]
│
▼
[Test against historical data]
│
├── High false positive rate ──► [Refine exclusions]
│
└── Acceptable FP rate ──► [Deploy in alert mode]
│
▼
[Monitor for 2 weeks]
│
▼
[Review alert quality]
│
▼
[Promote to production detection]
Workflow 3: Evasion Incident Response
[Evasion technique detected]
│
▼
[Assess scope: Which endpoints affected?]
│
▼
[Correlate with initial access and persistence]
│
▼
[Determine if adversary achieved objectives]
│
├── Active intrusion ──► [Full incident response]
│
└── Isolated event ──► [Remediate endpoint, enhance detection]