mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
68 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
68 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
# Detailed Hunting Workflow - DLL Sideloading
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## Phase 1: Sysmon DLL Load Analysis
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### Step 1.1 - Unsigned DLLs Loaded by Signed Applications
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=7 Signed=false
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| where match(Image, "(?i)\\\\(Program Files|Windows)\\\\")
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| where NOT match(ImageLoaded, "(?i)\\\\(Windows|Program Files)\\\\")
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| stats count by Image ImageLoaded Signature Computer
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| sort -count
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```
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### Step 1.2 - DLL Loads from Unusual Directories
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=7
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| where match(ImageLoaded, "(?i)(\\\\temp\\\\|\\\\appdata\\\\|\\\\public\\\\|\\\\downloads\\\\)")
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| where Signed=false OR Signature="?"
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| stats count by Image ImageLoaded Computer User
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| sort -count
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```
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### Step 1.3 - KQL for MDE DLL Sideloading
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```kql
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DeviceImageLoadEvents
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| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
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| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OneDriveUpdater.exe","DismHost.exe","WerFault.exe")
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| where not(FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files")
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| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256
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```
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## Phase 2: Legitimate App in Wrong Location
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### Step 2.1 - Signed Binaries Running Outside Standard Paths
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=1
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| where NOT match(Image, "(?i)^(C:\\\\Windows|C:\\\\Program Files)")
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| where match(Image, "(?i)(svchost|explorer|rundll32|dllhost|OneDrive|Teams)\.exe$")
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| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage Hashes
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```
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## Phase 3: Hash-Based Detection
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### Step 3.1 - Known-Bad DLL Hashes
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Compare loaded DLL hashes against threat intelligence:
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=7
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| rex field=Hashes "SHA256=(?<sha256>[A-Fa-f0-9]{64})"
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| lookup threat_intel_hashes sha256 OUTPUT malware_family confidence
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| where isnotnull(malware_family)
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| table _time Computer Image ImageLoaded sha256 malware_family
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```
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## Phase 4: Behavioral Correlation
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### Step 4.1 - Network Activity After DLL Load
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Correlate DLL loads with subsequent network connections:
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=7 Signed=false
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| rename Image as proc_image
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| join proc_image Computer [
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search index=sysmon EventCode=3
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| rename Image as proc_image
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| where NOT match(DestinationIp, "^(10\.|172\.|192\.168\.)")
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]
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| table _time Computer proc_image ImageLoaded DestinationIp DestinationPort
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```
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