mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
48 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
48 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
# DCSync Attack Detection Hunt Template
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## Hunt Metadata
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| Field | Value |
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|-------|-------|
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| Hunt ID | TH-DCSYNC-YYYY-MM-DD-NNN |
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| Analyst | |
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| Date | |
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| Status | [ ] In Progress / [ ] Complete |
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## Hypothesis
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> An adversary with elevated AD privileges is performing DCSync to extract password hashes from Active Directory by replicating directory data from a non-domain-controller machine.
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## Pre-Hunt Checklist
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- [ ] Event ID 4662 audit policy enabled on all DCs
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- [ ] SACL configured on domain root object
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- [ ] Domain controller inventory documented
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- [ ] Known service accounts with replication rights documented
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- [ ] Azure AD Connect accounts identified (if hybrid)
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## DCSync Detection Findings
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| # | Timestamp | Subject Account | Source Machine | Target DC | Replication Rights | Severity |
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|---|-----------|-----------------|----------------|-----------|-------------------|----------|
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| 1 | | | | | | |
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## Accounts with Replication Rights Audit
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| Account | Type | Rights | Legitimate | Justification |
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|---------|------|--------|-----------|---------------|
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| | User/Service/Computer | Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All | Yes/No | |
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## Post-DCSync Impact Assessment
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| Check | Status | Notes |
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|-------|--------|-------|
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| KRBTGT hash potentially compromised | | |
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| Domain Admin hashes extracted | | |
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| Service account credentials at risk | | |
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| Golden Ticket creation possible | | |
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## Response Actions
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1. **Disable**: [Compromised accounts]
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2. **Reset**: [KRBTGT password -- twice, 12 hours apart]
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3. **Revoke**: [Unauthorized replication rights]
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4. **Investigate**: [Source machine forensics]
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5. **Monitor**: [Subsequent credential abuse attempts]
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