Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

1.9 KiB

Falco Container Escape Detection Runbook

Alert Triage Template

Alert Details

Field Value
Alert Time
Rule Name
Priority
Container Name
Container Image
Pod Name
Namespace
Node
User
Process Command
MITRE Technique

Triage Steps

Immediate Actions (0-5 minutes)

  • Acknowledge alert in SIEM/SOAR
  • Verify alert is not a false positive (check known exceptions list)
  • Identify the affected pod and node
  • Check if the container is still running

Investigation (5-30 minutes)

  • Capture pod spec: kubectl get pod <name> -n <ns> -o yaml
  • Review container security context
  • Check if container is privileged
  • Review mounted volumes for host paths
  • Examine process tree from Falco output
  • Check for other alerts from same container/node
  • Review Kubernetes audit logs for the same timeframe

Containment (if confirmed)

  • Isolate pod with network policy deny-all
  • Cordon affected node: kubectl cordon <node>
  • Capture forensic data from container
  • Kill compromised container: kubectl delete pod <name> -n <ns>
  • Review other pods on same node for compromise

Recovery

  • Scan node for rootkits
  • Rebuild node if compromise confirmed
  • Patch vulnerable container image
  • Update network policies
  • Uncordon node after verification

False Positive Exceptions

Container Image Rule Justification Approved By Date

Escalation Matrix

Priority Response Time Notify
CRITICAL Immediate Security On-Call + Engineering Lead
WARNING 15 minutes Security On-Call
NOTICE 1 hour Security Team queue
INFO Next business day Review in daily standup