mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 16:40:24 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
75 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
75 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference: Detecting Container Escape Attempts
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## Common Escape Vectors (MITRE ATT&CK)
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| Vector | Technique | MITRE ID |
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|--------|-----------|----------|
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| Privileged container | Mount host FS, load modules | T1611 |
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| Docker socket mount | Create privileged container | T1610 |
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| Kernel exploits | CVE-2022-0185, Dirty Pipe | T1068 |
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| Capability abuse | SYS_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE | T1548 |
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| Sensitive mounts | /proc/sysrq-trigger, cgroup release_agent | T1611 |
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| Namespace escape | nsenter, unshare | T1611 |
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## Docker CLI Inspection
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```bash
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# Check if container is privileged
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docker inspect --format='{{.HostConfig.Privileged}}' <container>
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# Check added capabilities
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docker inspect --format='{{.HostConfig.CapAdd}}' <container>
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# Check PID namespace mode
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docker inspect --format='{{.HostConfig.PidMode}}' <container>
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# Check volume mounts
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docker inspect --format='{{range .Mounts}}{{.Source}}:{{.Destination}} {{end}}' <container>
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```
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## Falco JSON Alert Format
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```json
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{
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"time": "2024-01-15T10:30:00.000Z",
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"rule": "Container Escape via Privileged Mode",
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"priority": "Critical",
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"output": "Container escape attempt...",
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"output_fields": {
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"container.name": "attacker-pod",
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"container.image.repository": "alpine",
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"proc.cmdline": "nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n"
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},
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"tags": ["container", "escape", "T1611"]
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}
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```
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## Linux Audit Rules for Escape Detection
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```bash
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# /etc/audit/rules.d/container-escape.rules
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setns -S unshare -k container_escape
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -S umount2 -k container_mount
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -S finit_module -k kernel_module
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-w /var/run/docker.sock -p rwxa -k docker_socket
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```
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## Dangerous Linux Capabilities
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| Capability | Escape Risk |
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|------------|-------------|
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| CAP_SYS_ADMIN | Mount filesystems, manage cgroups |
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| CAP_SYS_PTRACE | Trace/debug any process |
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| CAP_NET_ADMIN | Network namespace manipulation |
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| CAP_SYS_MODULE | Load/unload kernel modules |
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| CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH | Bypass file read permissions |
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## CLI Usage
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```bash
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python agent.py --falco-log /var/log/falco/events.json
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python agent.py --audit-log /var/log/audit/audit.log
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python agent.py --check-containers
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python agent.py --container-id abc123
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```
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