mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
902 B
902 B
Workflows - Detecting Azure Service Principal Abuse
Detection Workflow
1. Log Collection → Ingest Azure AD Audit + Sign-in logs to SIEM
2. Rule Activation → Enable detection analytics for SP abuse patterns
3. Alert Triage → Validate alerts against known automation accounts
4. Investigation → Correlate credential changes with sign-in anomalies
5. Containment → Disable compromised SP, rotate credentials
6. Remediation → Remove unauthorized permissions, review ownership
Investigation Workflow
1. Identify affected service principal (name, object ID, app ID)
2. Review recent credential changes (new secrets/certificates)
3. Check role assignments for privilege escalation
4. Analyze sign-in logs for unusual IPs/locations
5. Review application ownership chain
6. Assess blast radius of compromised permissions
7. Document findings and initiate incident response