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sica-fondt/knowledge/cyber-skills/skills/detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse/references/api-reference.md
Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure 
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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Azure Service Principal Abuse Detection — API Reference

Libraries

Library Install Purpose
azure-identity pip install azure-identity Azure AD authentication
requests pip install requests Microsoft Graph API client

Microsoft Graph API Endpoints

Method Endpoint Description
GET /v1.0/servicePrincipals List service principals
GET /v1.0/servicePrincipals/{id} Get SP details and credentials
GET /v1.0/servicePrincipals/{id}/appRoleAssignments SP role assignments
GET /v1.0/directoryRoles List directory roles
GET /v1.0/directoryRoles/{id}/members Role members (includes SPs)
GET /v1.0/auditLogs/signIns Sign-in logs for SP activity
GET /v1.0/auditLogs/directoryAudits Directory change audit logs

OAuth2 Token Endpoint

POST https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/oauth2/v2.0/token
grant_type=client_credentials
scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default

High-Privilege Directory Roles

Role Risk
Global Administrator Full tenant control
Application Administrator Can create/manage all apps
Cloud Application Administrator Manage cloud app registrations
Privileged Role Administrator Manage role assignments

Service Principal Abuse Indicators

Indicator Description Severity
Multiple password credentials Possible backdoor persistence HIGH
Expired credentials not removed Credential hygiene gap MEDIUM
SP with Global Admin role Overprivileged automation CRITICAL
Unusual sign-in location Compromised SP credentials HIGH
New credential added to SP Persistence via credential injection CRITICAL

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID Description
Account Manipulation T1098 Add credentials to SP
Valid Accounts: Cloud T1078.004 Abuse SP credentials
Trusted Relationship T1199 Abuse multi-tenant SP trust

External References