mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
56 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
56 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
# Standards Reference: Tailscale Zero Trust VPN
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## Protocol Standards
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### WireGuard Protocol
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- **Encryption**: ChaCha20 for symmetric encryption
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- **Key Exchange**: Curve25519 for Diffie-Hellman
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- **MAC**: Poly1305 for message authentication
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- **Hashing**: BLAKE2s for hashing
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- **Framework**: Noise Protocol Framework for key negotiation
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### NIST SP 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture
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- Tailscale implements identity-aware proxying (Section 3.2.2)
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- End-to-end encryption satisfies data-in-transit requirements
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- ACL-based access control implements least privilege access
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- Device identity via WireGuard keys maps to device trust
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### NIST SP 800-77: Guide to IPsec VPNs
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- WireGuard provides alternative to IPsec with reduced complexity
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- Tailscale automates key distribution and NAT traversal
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- Mesh topology eliminates single point of failure
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## Tailscale Security Model
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### Identity Layer
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- Authentication via OIDC-compatible identity providers
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- SSO integration with Okta, Azure AD, Google Workspace, GitHub
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- MFA enforcement through identity provider policies
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- Key expiry forces periodic re-authentication
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### Network Layer
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- Default deny ACL policy (zero trust)
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- Per-connection authorization based on identity and tags
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- No implicit trust based on network location
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- All traffic encrypted with WireGuard (256-bit keys)
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### Device Layer
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- Unique WireGuard key pair per device
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- Device authorization required before network access
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- Network Lock prevents unauthorized node addition
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- Ephemeral nodes for temporary workloads
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## Compliance Considerations
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### SOC 2
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- End-to-end encryption for data in transit
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- ACL-based access control for authorization
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- Audit logging for all connection events
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- Key management through coordination server
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### GDPR
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- Data minimization: Tailscale only routes traffic, does not inspect
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- Encryption: All traffic encrypted end-to-end
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- Self-hosted option (Headscale) for data sovereignty
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- Log retention configurable per organization policy
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