mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
65 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference: Cloud Incident Response Agent
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## Overview
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Automates AWS cloud incident response: disables compromised access keys, attaches deny-all policies, isolates EC2 instances, captures EBS snapshots for forensics, and queries CloudTrail for attacker activity timeline.
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## Dependencies
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| Package | Version | Purpose |
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|---------|---------|---------|
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| requests | >=2.28 | HTTP API calls |
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| AWS CLI | >=2.0 | AWS service interaction (subprocess) |
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## CLI Usage
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```bash
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python agent.py --incident-id INC-2025-001 --username compromised-user \
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--access-key-id AKIA... --instance-id i-0abc123 --output report.json
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```
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## Arguments
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| Argument | Required | Description |
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|----------|----------|-------------|
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| `--incident-id` | Yes | Incident ticket identifier |
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| `--username` | Yes | Compromised IAM username |
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| `--access-key-id` | No | Access key ID to disable |
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| `--instance-id` | No | EC2 instance ID to isolate |
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| `--forensic-sg` | No | Forensic isolation security group ID |
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| `--output` | No | Output report file path |
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## Key Functions
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### `aws_disable_access_key(username, access_key_id)`
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Disables a compromised IAM access key by setting status to Inactive via `aws iam update-access-key`.
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### `aws_attach_deny_all(username)`
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Attaches the `AWSDenyAll` managed policy to block all API calls from the compromised user.
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### `aws_isolate_ec2(instance_id, forensic_sg)`
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Changes an EC2 instance's security groups to a forensic isolation group that denies all traffic.
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### `aws_snapshot_ebs(instance_id)`
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Creates forensic snapshots of all EBS volumes attached to the compromised instance.
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### `aws_query_cloudtrail(username, hours_back)`
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Queries CloudTrail for all API events made by the compromised identity, parsing source IP, user agent, and resources.
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### `aws_list_attacker_resources(username, events)`
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Filters CloudTrail events for resource creation actions (Create*, Run*, Put*, Attach*).
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### `aws_check_all_regions_instances()`
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Scans all AWS regions for running EC2 instances to detect crypto-mining deployments.
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## AWS CLI Commands Used
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| Command | Purpose |
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|---------|---------|
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| `aws iam update-access-key` | Disable access key |
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| `aws iam attach-user-policy` | Attach deny-all policy |
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| `aws ec2 modify-instance-attribute` | Change security groups |
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| `aws ec2 create-snapshot` | Capture EBS volume snapshot |
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| `aws cloudtrail lookup-events` | Query API audit trail |
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| `aws ec2 describe-regions` | List all regions |
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