# G3 — Defense model *(cross-cutting · emergent)* ## 1. Component The two-layer defense, **emergent from organs already specced** — not new code. Layer 1 = semantic saturation (the Celtic-Cross token-flow, B3). Layer 2 = the Ada trust boundary (D1). This doc is the contract that says how they combine. ## 2. Status / certainty C4 — both layers decided; layer 2 is WORKING (D1), layer 1 is the B3 draw used as armor. ## 3. Language & location Realized by B3 (token-flow) + D1 (SPARK boundary). No new module; contract doc only. ## 4. Does / does-not - **Does:** push injection material down the attention gradient with **meaningful** content (the 10 accumulating cards), and structurally validate every crossing at Ada. - **Does-not:** flood noise (saturation is *semantic*); watch the Brain (central cut). ## 5. Interface contract - **Layer 1 (B3):** the iterative 10-card spread occupies context with meaningful symbol-material — "free armour when self-hosting" (tokens = owned-hardware cycles, not API cost). - **Layer 2 (D1):** blocklist (fetch→build→execute, base64 chains) · provenance on memory writes · no self-authority-reclassification · rate-limit escalation. - **Threat corpus** kept as study specimens only (prompts.json cryptojacking, HiFi_ProToCol authority reclass, gorkprotocol memory injection, THEORY.md hollow-math) — defended against, never built. ## 6. Dependencies & stubs B3 (layer 1) + D1 (layer 2). Both stubbable independently; this contract just asserts they co-apply. ## 7. Invariants / laws - **L1 (C4):** defense is **semantic saturation, not noise flooding**. - **L2 (C5):** every crossing is structurally validated at Ada (D1 laws). - **L3 (C5):** threat specimens are a **study corpus only** — never a build target. ## 8. Build steps 1. Ensure B3 accumulation actually fills context as designed (layer 1). 2. Ensure D1 admits/blocks per its laws (layer 2). 3. Keep the threat corpus quarantined as reference (e.g. `reference/`), not wired. ## 9. Tests Layer 1: spread occupies the expected context share by final cognition. Layer 2: D1 trust_tests pass. Corpus: a static check that nothing under the threat corpus is referenced by a build target. ## 10. Open items - Where the threat-specimen corpus lives (reference/ archive). Measuring saturation effectiveness (C1).